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Abstract
The vulnerabilities of deep neural networks against adversarial examples have become a major
concern for deploying these models in sensitive domains. Devising a denitive defense against such
attacks is proven to be challenging, and the methods relying on detecting adversarial samples have
been shown to be only eective when the attacker is oblivious to the detection mechanism, i.e.,
in non-adaptive attacks. In this paper, we propose an eective and practical method for detecting
adaptive/dynamic adversaries. In short, we train adversary-robust auxiliary detectors to discriminate
in-class natural examples from adversarially crafted out-of-class examples. To identify a potential
adversary, we rst obtain the estimated class of the input using the classication system, and then
use the corresponding detector to verify whether the input is a natural example of that class, or is an
adversarially manipulated example. Experimental results on MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset show that
our method could withstand adaptive PGD attacks. Furthermore, we demonstrate that with our novel
training scheme our models learn signicant more robust representation than ordinary adversarial
training.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have become the staple of modern machine learning pipelines, achieving state-of-
the-art performance on extremely dicult tasks in various applications such as computer vision [1], speech
recognition [2], machine translation [3], robotics [4], and biomedical image analysis [5]. Despite their
outstanding performance, these networks are shown to be vulnerable against various types of adversarial
attacks, including evasion attacks (aka, inference or perturbation attacks) [6, 7, 8, 9] and poisoning attacks
[10, 11]. These vulnerabilities in deep neural networks hinder their deployment in sensitive domains
including, but not limited to, health care, nances, autonomous driving, and defense-related applications
and has become a major security concern.
Due to these deciencies there has been a recent surge toward designing defense mechanisms against
adversarial attacks [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17], which has in turn motivated the design of stronger attacks that
defeat the proposed defenses [7, 18, 19, 8, 20, 21, 22, 23]. In addition, the proposed defenses have been
shown to be to limited and often not eective and easy to overcome [21]. Alternatively, a large body of
work has focused on detection of adversarial examples [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37].
While training robust classier focuses on maintaining performance in presence of adversarial examples,
adversarial detection only cares for detecting these examples.
The majority of the existing detection mechanism focus on non-adaptive attackers, for which the attacks
are not specically tuned/tailored to bypass the detection mechanism and the attacker is oblivious to the
detection mechanism. In fact, Carlini et al. [38] and Athalye et al. [21] showed that the detection methods
presented in [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 35], only apply to non-adaptive attacks and could not withstand
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adaptive adversarial attacks. In other words, their detection mechanisms could be easily bypassed by an
attacker who has knowledge of the detection mechanism and could craft adversarial examples that are
optimized to fool both the classier/regressor and the detector.
Figure 1: A conceptual visualization of our divide-and-
conquer detection mechanism with adversary-robust
detectors.
In this paper, we are interested in detection
mechanisms for adversarial examples that can
withstand adaptive attacks. Unlike previous ap-
proaches that assume adversarial and natural
samples coming from dierent distributions, thus
rely on using one classier to distinguish be-
tween them, we instead based on the classica-
tion system’s output to partition the input space
into subspaces, and perform adversarial/natural
sample classication in subspaces. Importantly,
the partition allow us to drop the adversarial con-
strain and employ the adversarial robust opti-
mization objective [16] to train robust classiers
in each subspace. Although similar, our approach
diers from standard adversarial training in that
each subspace classier essentially models the distribution of that class’s natural samples (but not adver-
sarial examples), and thus is able to learn more robust and interpretable features that could generalize
better to potentially stronger attacks. Although we only demonstrate robustness to adaptive PGD attacks,
the fact that our models learn robust representation that align better with human perception promises as
much, if not more, than ordinary adversarial training. Figure 1 demonstrates the concept of our hardened
detectors against attacks.
2 Related works
Adversarial attacks Since the pioneering work of Szegedy et al. [6], a large body of work has focused on
designing algorithms that achieve eective attacks [7, 39, 18, 22, 40, 8]. More recently, iterative projected
gradient descent (PGD), originally proposed by Kurakin et al. [18], has been empirically identied as the
most eective approach for performing norm ball constrained attacks [16], and the attack can reasonably
approximate the optimal attack. Compared to ordinary graident descent, PGD needs one more step to
project the result to the feasible set as dened by the norm ball: xn+1 = Projx+S(xn − γ · ∇f (xn)).
Detection techniques Several adversary detection methods have been proposed in recent years. The
majority of these detection methods are based on the following general idea: given a trained K-class
classier, f : Rd → {1...K}, and its corresponding clean training samples, D = {xi ∈ Rd }Ni=1, generate
a set of adversarially attacked samples D ′ = {x ′j ∈ Rd }Mj=1, and devise a mechanism to discriminate D
from D ′. For instance, Gong et al. [26] use this exact idea and learn a binary classier to distinguish the
natural and adversarially perturbed sets. Similarly, Grosse et al. [27] append a new “attacked” class to the
classier, f , and re-train a secured network that classies clean images, x ∈ D, into the K class and all
attacked images, x ′ ∈ D ′ to the (K + 1)’th class. In contrast to [26, 27], which aim at detecting adversarial
examples directly from the image content, Metzen et al. [28] trained a binary classier that receives as
input the features from intermediate layers of the classier network, f , and distinguished D from D ′.
More importantly, Metzen et al. [28] considered the so called case of adaptive/dynamic adversary and
proposed to harden the detector against attacks using a similar adversarial training approach as in [7].
Unfortunately, all the above mentioned detection methods fail under an adaptive adversary equipped with
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a strong attack [38, 21]. Dierent from the above approach, Zheng et al. [36] model the class conditional
distribution of network hidden states using Gaussian Mixture Models, and detect adversarial examples
based on likelihood scores. The statistics of network hidden states are computed from natural samples, thus
their method generalizes better to dierent attacks. But their density models are not actively adversarial
trained, thus is not robust to white-box attacks.
3 Detection method
For a K(K ≥ 2) class classication problem, given a dataset of natural samples D = {xi }Ni=1,xi ∈ Rd , along
with labels {yi }Ni=1,yi ∈ {1..K}, let f : Rd → {1...K} be the classier that is used to do classication on D.
With the labels and predicted labels the dataset respectively forms the partitionD = ⋃Dk andDf = ⋃Dfk ,
where Dk = {x : y = k,x ∈ D}, and Dfk = {x : f (x) = k,x ∈ D}. LetH = {hk }Kk=1,hk : Rd → {0, 1} be
a set of binary classiers (detectors), in which hk is trained to discriminate natural samples classied as k ,
from adversarial samples that fool to be classied as k . Let D ′ be a set of `p norm bounded adversarial
examples crafted from D: D ′ = {x + δ : f (x + δ ) , y, f (x) = y,x ∈ D,δ ∈ S}, S = {δ ∈ Rd | | |δ | |p ≤ ϵ}.
Consider the following procedure to determine whether a sample x in D ∪D ′ is an adversary:
First obtain the estimated class label k = f (x), then use the k-th detector to predict: if hk (x) = 0
then x is an adversarial sample, otherwise it’s a natural sample.
The detection accuracy of the algorithm is given by∑K
k=1 |{x : hk (x) = 1,x ∈ Dfk }| + |{x : hk (x) = 0,x ∈ D ′
f
k }|
|D| + |D ′ | , (1)
where D ′fk = {x : f (x) = k,x ∈ D ′}. Thus minimizing the algorithm’s classication error is equivalent to
minimizing classication error of individual detectors. Employing empirical risk minimization, detector k ,
parameterized by θk , is trained by
θ ∗k = argmin
θk
Ex∼D′fk
[
L(hk (x ;θk ), 0)
]
+ Ex∼Dfk
[
L(hk (x ;θk ), 1)
]
, (2)
where L is the binary cross-entropy loss.
In the case of adaptive attacks, adversaries are crafted to fool both the classier and detectors, and accuracy
of a naively trained detector (using 2) could be signicantly reduced. In order to be robust to adaptive
attacks, it’s necessary to incorporate the attack into the training objective: based on the idea of adversarial
robust optimization [16], detector k is instead trained by
min
θk
ρ(θk ), where ρ(θk ) = Ex∼Df\k
[
max
δ ∈S,f (x+δ )=k
L(hk (x + δ ;θk ), 0)
]
+ Ex∼Dfk
[
L(hk (x ;θk ), 1)
]
, (3)
where Df\k = {x : f (x) , k,y , k,x ∈ D}, and we have assumed perturbation budget is large enough:
∀x ∈ Df\k , ∃δ ∈ S, s.t. f (x + δ ) = k . Now because
max
δ ∈S
L(hk (x + δ ;θk ), 0) ≥ max
δ ∈S,f (x+δ )=k
L(hk (x + δ ;θk ), 0),
we could instead drop the f (x + δ ) = k constrain and optimize the unconstrained objective
ρ(θk ) = Ex∼Df\k
[
max
δ ∈S
L(hk (x + δ ;θk ), 0)
]
+ Ex∼Dfk
[
L(hk (x ;θk ), 1)
]
. (4)
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Further, we use the fact that when D is used as training set f could overt such that D\k = {xi : yi , k}
and Dk are respectively good approximations of Df\k and D
f
k . This leads to the following objective
min
θk
ρ(θk ), where ρ(θk ) = Ex∼D\k
[
max
δ ∈S
L(hk (x + δ ;θk ), 0)
]
+ Ex∼Dk
[
L(hk (x ;θk ), 1)
]
. (5)
In a nutshell, each detector is trained using in-class natural examples and detector-adversaries crafted
from out-of-class samples. The rst term in the nal objective is similar to the one in Madry et al. [16] and
iterative PGD attack is currently the most eective approach for solving the inner optimization.
4 Threat model
We assume the detector has full knowledge of the classication and detection system (i.e., white-box access
to f and {hk }Kk=1). To mount a successful untargeted attack, the attacker would have to rst obtain the
predicted label of the adversary, then try to overcome the corresponding detector. Thus the untargeted
scheme boils down to an adaptive targeted attack, and we need to show that all our detectors could
withstand such attacks. Referring to objective 3, to test detector k , with the goal of fooling both f and
hk , we use Df\k = {x : f (x) , k,y , k,x ∈ D} to craft targeted adversaries D ′
f
\k , and test the detection
performance on {({(x , 0) : x ∈ D ′f\k } ∪ {(x , 1) : x ∈ D
f
k }}. Note that although we focus on testing
individual detectors, in a real-world scenario the attacker could bring down overall detection performance
on a set of adversaries by assigning each adversary to its most vulnerable detector.
To realize such attacks, we consider two optimization methods. For the rst we follow CW [38]: to attack
on class k , we use detector k’s output logit z(hk )∈ R (where z(hk ) < 0 indicates detection of an attack) and
the classier logits z(f ) to construct a surrogate classier д with its output logits, z(д) ∈ RK+1, being:
z(д)i =
{
z(f )i if i ≤ K ,
(−z(hk ) + 1) ·maxj z(f )j if i = K + 1.
(6)
The new class, K + 1, indicates detection of an attack. With the attacking goal k , an adversarial example x ′
is crafted by minimizing the following loss function
L(x ′) = max{z(д(x ′))i : i , k} − z(f (x ′))k . (7)
We observe that the optimization tends to stuck at the point where z(f (x ′))k keeping changing signs while
z(hk ) staying as a large negative number (which indicates detection).
To derive a more eective attack we consider a more straightforward objective:
L(x ′) =
{
max{z(f (x ′))i : i , k} − z(f (x ′))k if z(f (x ′))k ≤ {z(f (x ′))i : i , k},
−z(d(x ′)) else. (8)
In short, if x ′ has not yet been classied as k , optimize it for that goal; otherwise optimize it for fooling the
detector. These two loss functions are optimized using iterative PGD attacks.
5 Experiments
Testing schemes In principle, models trained with objective 5 should be tested with objective 4, if
the classier f is not perfect on test set. That is, to test detector k , we use test samples Df\k to craft
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detector-adversaries D ′f\k = {argmaxx+δ L(hk (x + δ ;θk ) : x ∈ D
f
\k )}, and test detection performance on
{(x , 0) : x ∈ D ′f\k } ∪ {(x , 1) : x ∈ D
f
k }. Since on MNIST dataset the classier already reaches a high
accuracy of 99.3%, for the sake of simplicity, we use D\k and Dk in place of Df\k and D
f
k to perform
the test. For CIFAR10 of which test accuracy is 95.01% we stick to Df\k and D
f
k . The test is referred as
detector-adv in the results section. All tests use xed start attacks unless otherwise specied.
Next we test against the threat model (referred as adaptive-adv). The test scenario is a correspondence to
objective 3, and is described in Section 4. Again for MNIST dataset we use D\k and Dk in place of Df\k
and Dfk to perform the test.
We additionally report performances on natural examples and static adversaries (i.e., adversaries crafted
based solely on the classier). For natural examples we report the performance of each detector on
{(x , 0) : x ∈ D\k } ∪ {(x , 1) : x ∈ Dk }. For static adversaries we use untargeted iterative PGD attacks
to craft the adversarial set D ′ = {x + δ : f (x + δ ) , y, f (x) = y,x ∈ D,δ ∈ S}, and then use
classier f to partition the dataset D ∪ D ′ = ⋃(D ′fk ∪ Dfk ), and report detector k’s performance on
{(x , 0) : x ∈ D ′fk } ∪ {(x , 1) : x ∈ D
f
k }.
Apart from quantitative results, in the same spirit as [41], we use large perturbation examples to empirical
examine the robustness of models.
PGD attack implementation At each step of PGD attack adversaries are updated using gradient descent.
In presence of vanishing gradient when optimizing against the cross-entropy loss, normalized steepest
gradient descent, with its `2 and `∞ update rule being xn+1 = xn−γ ∇f (xn )‖∇f (xn ) ‖2 and xn+1 = xn−γ ·sign(∇f (xn)),
is more eective than standard gradient descent [16]. Another popular choice is using Adam [42] optimizer
but optimizing with respect to model’s logit output [8]. On MNIST dataset our training adversaries are
optimized using Adam, but adversaries optimized with both approaches are tested. On CIFAR10 we only
use normalized steepest gradient descent.
Performance metric We use AUC (area under the ROC Curve) to measure detection performances. The
metric could be interpreted as the probability that the detector assigns a higher score to a random positive
sample than to a random negative example. A random detector has a AUC score of 0.5 while a perfect one
has score of 1.0.
5.1 MNIST experiments
Table 1: PGD attack steps and step sizes for model
training and validation.
`2 models `∞ models
ϵ = 2.5 ϵ = 5.0 ϵ = 0.3 ϵ = 0.5
Train 100, 0.1 200, 0.1 100, 0.01 100, 0.01
Validation 200, 0.1 200, 0.1 200, 0.01 200, 0.01
Training We use 50K samples from the original
training set for training and the rest 10K sam-
ples for validation, and report test performances
based on the epoch-saved checkpoint that gives
the best validation performance. All detectors
are trained using a network consisting of two
max-pooled convolutional layers each with 32
and 64 lters, and a fully connected layer of size
1024, same as the one used in [16]. At each iteration we sample a batch of 320 samples, from which in-class
samples are used as positive samples, and out-of-class samples are used as the source for adversaries
that will be used as negative samples. To balance positives and negatives at each batch, we resample the
out-of-class set to have same number of samples as in-class set. Using dierent `2, `∞, and ϵ combinations
we trained four models, with training and validation adversaries optimized using PGD attacks of dierent
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steps and step size (see Table 1 for details). At each step of PGD attack we use the Adam optimizer to
perform gradient descent, both for `2 and `∞ constrained optimizations. All models are trained for 100
epochs.
Results In Table 2 our models exhibit robustness to adversaries crafted using much stronger PGD attacks,
for both Adam and normalized steepest gradient descent based attacks. We note in Table 9 attacking with
multiple random starts doesn’t decrease model robustness signicantly.
Table 2: AUC scores of the rst two detectors tested with dierent strengths of PGD attacks with dierent
gradient descent methods.
PGD attack
steps, step size
`∞, ϵ = 0.3 models `∞, ϵ = 0.5 models
k = 0 k = 1 k = 0 k = 1
Adam
200, 0.01 0.99959 0.99971 0.99830 0.99869
2000, 0.005 0.99958 0.99971 0.99796 0.99861
Normalized steepest gradient descent
200, 0.01 0.99962 0.99973 0.99820 0.99901
2000, 0.005 0.99959 0.99971 0.99795 0.99872
PGD attack
steps, step size
`2, ϵ = 2.5 models `2, ϵ = 5.0 models
k = 0 k = 1 k = 0 k = 1
Adam
200, 0.1 0.99962 0.99968 0.99578 0.99987
2000, 0.05 0.99927 0.99900 0.99529 0.99918
Normalized steepest gradient descent
200, 0.1 0.99906 0.99916 0.99960 0.99997
2000, 0.05 0.99855 0.99883 0.99237 0.99994
In Table 4 we report the detection performances of `∞ trained models under various testing schemes. In
detector-adv test, large perturbation model (ϵ = 0.5) seems to perform worse than small perturbation model
(ϵ = 0.3), but in fact it is much more eective (at detecting adversaries). To see this, we rst notice that
training with large perturbation does not deteriorate model performances on natural examples much (the
natural test). Second, the cross-perturbation test in Table 3 shows that, for detecting small perturbation
adversaries, large perturbation models perform almost as well as small perturbation models, but for
detecting large perturbation adversaries, small perturbation model performs much worse. Figure 4 gives
some hints: adversaries took full advantage of the perturbation limit and transformed to the appearance of
target class; even for human eyes they are hard to detect.
Adaptive attacks using 8 is more eective (lower AUC scores) than using 7. In theory adaptive attacks
should underperform the test scheme (adaptive-adv vs. detector-adv) because the latter is unconstrained
optimization. We observe that this is not the case when perturbation limits are large (ϵ = 0.5 and ϵ = 5.0).
We speculate that when the search space is large, rst performing targeted attacks (as in 8) oers some
benets for approaching the optimal.
We observed that all models are able to detect static adversaries perfectly. Large perturbation samples in
Figure 3 show that our models learn signicant more robust features than standard adversarial training.
Table 3: AUC scores of cross-norm and cross-perturbation attacks for models of the rst two classes. Scores
for models trained with larger perturbations but tested with smaller ones are highlighted.
k = 0 models k = 1 models
`∞, ϵ = 0.3 `∞, ϵ = 0.5 `2, ϵ = 2.5 `2, ϵ = 5.0 `∞, ϵ = 0.3 `∞, ϵ = 0.5 `2, ϵ = 2.5 `2, ϵ = 5.0
`∞, ϵ = 0.3 0.99959 0.99966 0.99927 0.99925 0.99971 0.99967 0.99949 0.99984
`∞, ϵ = 0.5 0.99436 0.9983 0.99339 0.99767 0.99778 0.99869 0.99397 0.99961
`2, ϵ = 2.5 0.99974 0.99969 0.99962 0.99944 0.99965 0.99955 0.99968 0.99987
`2, ϵ = 5.0 0.96421 0.98816 0.97747 0.99577 0.98268 0.98687 0.98117 0.99986
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Table 4: AUC scores of `∞ models under various test schemes. Adversaries are crafted with 200 steps of
PGD attacks with step size of 0.01.
Test scheme ϵ k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8 k = 9
detector-adv 0.3 0.99959 0.99971 0.99876 0.99861 0.99859 0.99861 0.99795 0.99863 0.99687 0.994180.5 0.99830 0.99869 0.99327 0.99355 0.99314 0.99228 0.99424 0.99439 0.97875 0.9769
adaptive-adv
using 8
0.3 0.99961 0.99973 0.99881 0.99867 0.9986 0.99867 0.99815 0.99874 0.99703 0.99436
0.5 0.99809 0.99879 0.99402 0.99381 0.99329 0.99342 0.99396 0.99439 0.97701 0.97538
adaptive-adv
using 7
0.3 0.99997 0.99998 0.99991 0.99994 0.99987 0.9999 0.99991 0.99988 0.99974 0.99954
0.5 0.99998 0.99996 0.99974 0.99981 0.99977 0.99948 0.99987 0.99975 0.99974 0.99937
static-adv 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
natural 0.3 0.99999 0.99999 0.99997 0.99998 0.99996 0.99998 0.99993 0.99996 0.99985 0.999800.5 0.99999 0.99997 0.99993 0.99997 0.99991 0.99992 0.99984 0.99989 0.99965 0.99953
5.2 CIFAR10 experiments
Table 5: PGD attack steps and step
sizes for training CIFAR10 models.
Model Train steps, step size
`2, ϵ = 80 20, 10.0
`∞, ϵ = 2.0 10, 0.5
`∞, ϵ = 8.0 40, 0.5
TrainingWe train our CIFAR10 detectors using the ResNet model [1,
16]. To speedup training, we take advantage of a natural trained
classier: the subnetwork of f that denes the output logit z(f (·))k
is essentially a “detector”, that would output high values for samples
of class k , and low values for others. Our detector is then trained
by netuning the subnetwork using objective 5. Our pretrained
classier has a test accuracy of 95.01% (fetched from the CIFAR10
adversarial challenge [43]).
At each iteration of training we sample a batch of 300 samples, from which in-class samples are used as
positives, while an equal number of out-of-class samples are used as sources for adversaries. Adversaries
for training `2 and `∞ models are both optimized using PGD attack with normalized steepest gradient
descent [44]. PGD attack settings for training our models are detailed in Table 5. We report results based
on the best performances on the CIFAR10 test set (thus don’t claim generalization performance of the
proposed method).
Table 6: AUC scores of models
trained with dierent steps and
step sizes.
attack steps `∞, ϵ = 2.0 models
step size 10, 0.5 10, 1.0
10, 0.5 0.9866 0.9965
40, 0.1 0.9892 0.8848
Results The ϵ = 2.0 model histories in Figure 2 show that by ad-
versarial netuning the model reach adversarial robustness in a few
thousands of iterations, without sacricing performance on natural
samples (test nat AUC starts from 0.9971, ends at 0.9981). Adversar-
ial training on the ϵ = 8.0 model didn’t converge after an extended
20K iterations of training. The gap between train adv AUC and
test adv AUC of the latter is more pronounced, and we observed a
decrease of test nat AUC from 0.9971 to 0.9909.
We found training with adversaries optimized with a small enough step size to be essential for model
robustness. In table 6 we tested two `∞, ϵ = 2.0 models respectively trained with 0.5 and 1.0 step sizes. The
step size 1.0 model is not robust when tested with a much smaller step size. We observe that when training
the model, training set adv AUC reached 1.0 in less than one hundred iterations, but test set natural AUC
plummeted to around 0.95 and couldn’t recover thereafter.
The rst two tables in 7 demonstrate model robustness to stronger attacks under the same norm constrain.
7
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
iteration
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
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C
k = 0, , = 2.0 model
train nat AUC
train adv AUC
test nat AUC
test adv AUC
0 10000 20000 30000 40000
iteration
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
k = 0, , = 8.0 model
train nat AUC
train adv AUC
test nat AUC
test adv AUC
Figure 2: Training and testing AUC histories of `∞ models
Although the AUC score of the `∞, ϵ = 8.0 model is signicantly lower, the last table show that the model
exhibits robustness to smaller perturbation attacks, for both `2 and `∞ attacks, and the robustness is
comparable to that of models trained with smaller perturbations. In fact, training with a large perturbation
helps the model to learn more robust features (see Figure 5). Again in Table 9 attacking the CIFAR10
models with multiple random starts doesn’t decrease model robustness.
Table 7: AUC scores of models under dierent strengths of same norm and cross-norm PGD attacks.
`2 attack, `2, ϵ = 80 models
steps, step size k = 0 k = 1
20, 10 0.9839 0.9924
50, 5.0 0.9837 0.9922
`∞ attack, k = 0 models
steps, step size `∞, ϵ = 2.0 `∞, ϵ = 8.0
40, 0.5 0.9863 0.9234
80, 0.3 0.9863 0.9224
attack, bound, k = 0 model
steps, step size `∞, ϵ = 8.0
`2, ϵ = 80, 20, 10 0.9814
`∞, ϵ = 2.0, 10, 0.5 0.9841
Table 8: AUC scores of `∞, ϵ = 2.0 models under various tests. Adversaries are crafted with 10 steps of
PGD attacks with step size of 0.5. All models are trained for 20K iterations.
Test k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6 k = 7 k = 8 k = 9
detector-adv 0.9866 0.9926 0.9721 0.9501 0.9773 0.9636 0.9859 0.9908 0.9930 0.9916
adaptive-adv 8 0.9887 0.9942 0.9754 0.9565 0.9806 0.9692 0.9880 0.9922 0.9943 0.9929
adaptive-adv 7 0.9959 0.9981 0.9915 0.9798 0.9932 0.9855 0.9961 0.9974 0.9982 0.9977
static-adv 0.9836 0.9923 0.9812 0.9639 0.9820 0.9679 0.9851 0.9888 0.9891 0.9901
static-adv-start 0.4774 0.658 0.3979 0.1582 0.3728 0.3992 0.4869 0.6017 0.5647 0.7106
natural 0.9981 0.9974 0.9959 0.9878 0.9977 0.9926 0.9977 0.9992 0.9987 0.9976
natural-start 0.9971 0.9991 0.9953 0.9888 0.9979 0.9924 0.9982 0.9988 0.9984 0.9989
Similar to the MNIST result, Table 8 show that adaptive attacks using objective 8 is more eective, but the
attack didn’t outperform the unconstrained optimization (adaptive-adv vs. detector-adv). While on average
models are able to maintain performances on natural examples after adversarial netuning ( natural vs.
natural-start), their adversarial robustness has been dramatically improved (static-adv vs. static-adv-start).
We note that by comparing adaptive-adv with static-adv the models are in fact not performing worse; the
dataset for performing these two test are dierent (see Section 5).
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In consistent with the MNIST result, Figure 5 show that our `∞, ϵ = 8.0 model learn signicant more
interpretable features than the adversarial trained classier.
Table 9: AUC scores of models under xed start and multiple random starts attacks. MNIST `∞, ϵ = 0.5 and
`2, ϵ = 5.0 model respectively attacked using steps 200 step size 0.01, and steps 200 step size 0.1; CIFAR10
`∞, ϵ = 2.0 and `∞, ϵ = 8.0 model respectively attacked using steps 10 step size 0.5, and steps 40 step size
0.5.
MNIST k = 0 models
`∞, ϵ = 0.5 `2, ϵ = 5.0
xed start 0.99830 0.99578
50 random starts 0.99776 0.99501
CIFAR10 k = 0 models
`∞, ϵ = 2.0 `∞, ϵ = 8.0
xed start 0.9866 0.9234
10 random starts 0.9866 0.9233
Detector 0
Original
Nat classifier
Madry et al. 
adv classifier
Figure 3: Large perturbation (`∞, ϵ = 0.6) adversarial samples for the rst class. Both the detector and
adv classier [16] are trained using `∞, ϵ = 0.3 constrain. Classier adversaries are crafted by performing
targeted attack on the logit corresponding to the rst class. All adversarial samples on the right are
misclassied as 0 by their respective classier, but are perfectly detected by the left detector.
Figure 4: Adversary examples that successfully evaded `2, ϵ = 5.0 (left) and `∞, ϵ = 0.5 (right) models
(only showed samples for class 1, 2, and 3). In each group rst row are source images and second row are
adversaries optimized from the sources by attacking the corresponding detector. Left and right samples
respectively have maximum `2 and `∞ perturbations of 5.0 and 0.5.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a novel method for detecting adaptive adversarial examples. The idea is to
partition the input space in such a way that adversarial robust optimization could be employed to train
robust detector in each subspace. Our models are able to withstand adaptive PGD attacks on MNIST and
CIFAR10 dataset, and learn signicantly more robust representation than adversarial trained classier.
We also proposed a stronger adaptive attack objective, and explored a novel technique for speeding up
adversarial training. Currently we need to train a separate detector for each and every class; in future
work we will explore the possibility of shared computation or even using a single classication network to
realize the same functionality.
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Figure 5: Large perturbation adversarial examples for the rst class (airplane). The rst group of adversaries
are optimized using `2 PGD attacks with step size 10.0, while the second group `∞ PGD attacks with
step size 0.5. All samples in these two groups respectively reach the same `2 perturbation of 1200 and `∞
perturbation of 32.0. Adversaries are crafted by attacking the corresponding logit output. Madry et al. [16]
adv classier also trained with `∞, ϵ = 8.0 constrain.
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